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SECTION 15 JURISPRUDENCE IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA IN 2000
*

David L. Corbett, Karen Spector
and
Jonathan Strug***

**

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews the four decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in
2000 that considered equality rights issues under section 15 of the Charter.1 Our
goal is to summarize the cases and to comment upon each in terms of its
significance for equality rights jurisprudence.
We do not find strong common themes among the four cases (aside from the
fact that they were all decided in 2000). Granovsky2 is a pure section 15 case,
and involves an application of the Law3 case. In our view, Granovsky does not
extend the law, but it does illustrate the weaknesses in the Law analysis.
Boisbriand4 is a section 15 case involving Quebec human rights law. Again, we
do not believe it extends principles of equality rights jurisprudence; the
decision is consistent with a national normalization of human rights concepts.
________________________________________________________________
*
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1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703
(L‟Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Binnie JJ.).
3
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
4
Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal
(City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Boisbriand
(City), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665.
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Lovelace5 is an equality rights case, but one where the legislation underlying the
alleged discrimination was not placed in issue. As a result, the logic in the case
does not extend equality rights principles, although it does raise questions about
the strategies to be used in future cases where laws of both levels of government
are the basis of the alleged discrimination. Finally, Little Sisters6 is not really an
equality rights case at all; it is really about freedom of expression. The breaches
in that case were established clearly, so the real issues in the case concerned
identification of the source of those breaches, and determination of the
appropriate remedy. However, the appellants sought to argue that Canada‟s
obscenity laws discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and the Court does
consider those arguments, even after it concluded that those issues were not
properly raised in the case.

II. GRANOVSKY V. CANADA (MINISTER OF
EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION)7
In Granovsky, the appellant sought a disability pension under the Canada
Pension Plan. The Plan is a contributory scheme designed to provide benefits to
workers who contribute to it. It includes provisions for payment of disability
pensions to persons who are totally and permanently disabled and are thus forced
to leave the work force. Since the Plan is designed to protect employment
income, it requires that recipients have a “sufficient connection to the work force”
as demonstrated by a record of contributions to the Plan. In particular, to be
eligible for the disability pension, a claimant must have contributed to the Plan
in two of the previous three years, or in five of the previous 10 years.
Granovsky had a long history of back problems. He had been able to work
from time to time, but had been unable to maintain long-term full-time
employment. Granovsky had contributed to the Plan only once in the previous
10 years, although he had contributed in roughly half of the 15 years prior to
that.
Granovsky alleged that the Plan discriminated against partially disabled
persons, by making it more difficult for them to qualify for benefits on account
of their inability to work as a result of disability.
In the proceedings below, decision-makers had been unsympathetic to
Granovsky‟s claim of disability, characterizing his chronic back ailment as a “back
ache.” The Court noted that if it found for Granovsky, then the matter would have
________________________________________________________________
5

Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (L‟Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, McLachlin,
Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Arbour JJ.), per Iacobucci J.
6
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R.
1120.
7
Supra, note 2.
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to be sent back for a determination of whether he really was disabled as claimed.
This factor should have no bearing on the constitutional argument, but it did seem
to merit detailed comment by the Court. Although it is not stated in the decision,
the Court may have been mindful that the threshold for an obligation to contribute
to CPP is not high, and the Court may have had trouble in accepting the
proposition that a person could be so disabled so as not to be able to contribute to
CPP at all for nine out of 10 years, yet have been disabled only from time to time
during that period. In reading the decision, one gets the sense that the Court may
have felt, without finding, that the claimant must have been malingering in order
to compile such a record.
The Court found that Parliament did make allowances for persons temporarily
out of the work force when it crafted the eligibility provisions for disability
pensions by allowing non-contribution in one of the previous three or five of the
previous 10 years. This is “line drawing,” and the Court found that Parliament
had drawn the line in an appropriate place. Line drawing is inherently arbitrary.
Here, workers are allowed some absences from the work force, but they must
have a sufficient connection to the work force to engage the underlying purpose
of the program: protection of employment income.
There is one comment in the decision that deserves greater focus than was
given by the Court. The complainant argued that if the Court ruled against him,
he would be “thrown on” the welfare roles. The disability pension provision of
the Plan is not a social benefit program standing in isolation from other income
support programs. If, as a result of not being eligible for the disability pension,
the complainant was “thrown on” the welfare roles, he would be in receipt of
social assistance. There was no analysis of the relative levels of financial support
the alternative programs would provide. A person who has been disabled his or
her entire working life, and thus has had no opportunity to contribute to the CPP
at all, would be treated no differently than the complainant, but presumably
would be in receipt of other social assistance.
The Court‟s logic does not resonate as strongly as it might, given the absence
of a contextual analysis of other income support programs. In broad terms,
Parliament has created a class of persons whom we may call “disabled
workers.” The complainant did not qualify as such because he was not a
“worker.” The complainant says that he was not a worker because of his longterm partial disability — he was disabled for too long to qualify as a worker.
Justice Binnie seemed to deny this contextual approach in his characterization
of the Plan: “The CPP was designed to provide social insurance for Canadians
who experience a loss of earnings owing to retirement, disability, or the death of a
wage-earning spouse or parent. It is not a social welfare scheme.”8 It is not clear
________________________________________________________________
8

Granovsky, supra, note 2, at 712.
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why a “social insurance” plan is not a “social welfare scheme,” unless a “social
welfare scheme” is, by definition, a program of universal application solely based
on a needs test. If so, the distinction is driven purely by definitions rather than
functional distinctions, and is a tautology.
Without placing the CPP in the context of the overall scheme of income
support, it is well-nigh impossible to assess the effect of exclusion from that
particular program. Thus, the analysis devolves to a review of “line drawing”
by Parliament, and the usual sorts of questions that arise under such an
analysis:
The less severely disabled will no doubt argue that their interests are no less worthy of
protection than those whose disabilities are more severe. Is the legislature then
precluded from targeting the permanently disabled for special programs or services
(special paratransit public bus facilities for example) without making the same
services and programs available to those whose disabilities are temporary, and if so,
how temporary would be sufficient to qualify?9

This reasoning does not do justice to Granovsky‟s claim. He was not seeking
to extend a program that is targeted to the permanently disabled. His claim is
based on a permanent disability and is premised on the argument that he should
not be denied benefits because he was temporarily disabled for many years prior
to his permanent disability.
The Court applied the Law test10 in finding that Parliament‟s line drawing is
not discriminatory. Law calls for a “comparative approach,” where “[t]he
identification of the group in relation to which the appellant can properly claim
„unequal treatment‟ is crucial.”11 The appellant claimed that his situation should
be compared to persons who were able-bodied during the years leading up to
their disability. During those years, able-bodied persons are able to work and
contribute to the CPP. Thus, when they become disabled, they qualify for a
pension. Granovsky, solely by reason of disability, was unable to work
sufficiently to make contributions. The effect, therefore, is to deny him a
pension as a result of the long-term partial disability.
The Court found that the appellant chose the wrong “comparator group.”
Instead, the Court found that Granovsky should be compared to persons who
were permanently disabled during the time he was partially disabled. If this
comparison is correct, then the appellant received differential treatment because
he did not receive a disability pension at the time that the members of the
comparator group did receive one. This comparison, though, seems to
________________________________________________________________
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Id., at 714.
Supra, note 3, at 548.
Granovsky, supra, note 2, at 729.
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mischaracterize the appellant‟s claim. He did not claim (as he might have) that
restricting pensions to permanently disabled persons was constitutionally
unsound. It was only when he became totally disabled that he claimed to be
eligible for the pension. Thus, on the appellant‟s analysis, only persons who
become permanently disabled are eligible for disability pensions. During the
time preceding his total disability, he was not “like” those then in receipt of
disability pensions, and did not seek to classify himself as such. He was treated
like those who were not permanently disabled, and he did not challenge this
classification in so far as he was not then in receipt of a pension.
The Court‟s finding that Granovsky should be compared with permanently
disabled persons does not affect the decision under the first branch of the Law
test, and the Court concluded that Granovsky did suffer differential treatment.
However, the choice of comparator group impacts on the later analysis:
The appellant‟s argument depends upon the correctness of his choice of ablebodied workers as the comparator group. He says “The appellant Granovsky wishes
to make it clear that his submission is that he is relying on a comparison between
temporary disabled persons and able-bodied persons. The fact that some adjustment
has been made for „permanently disabled‟ persons is not the gravamen of Mr.
Granovsky‟s complaint.” If, as I believe, he has picked the wrong comparator group,
the rest of his analysis collapses under the weight of an erroneous premise.12

If the proper comparator group is permanently disabled persons, then it was
open to the Court to find that the program had been targeted to a group that is
more disadvantaged than Granovsky. As is noted above, it must be the case that
Parliament can target benefits to the permanently disabled in priority to the
temporarily disabled. The problem with the comparison is that the appellant is
permanently disabled now and seeks a benefit that is available to other persons
who are permanently disabled. The reason he is denied that benefit is that in the
past, he was partially disabled, and those receiving benefits were not (or at least
were not to the same extent as the appellant).
The Court‟s conclusion includes a recapitulation of the human dignity
principles of which we will hear much more over the coming years:
In these circumstances, in my opinion, the appellant fails to show that viewed from
the perspective of the hypothetical “reasonable” individual who shares the
appellant‟s attributes and who is dispassionate and fully apprised of the relevant
circumstances … his dignity or legitimate aspirations to human self-fulfilment have
been engaged.

________________________________________________________________
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Id., at 737-38.
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In other words, the appellant has not demonstrated a convincing human rights
dimension to his complaint….13

As is noted in many cases (and in particular in Boisbriand, discussed below),
disabilities have both subjective and objective dimensions. If we place the most
positive gloss on the facts of Granovsky‟s case, here is a person with significant
impairment of his ability to work as a result of disability. It has plagued him for
many years. He struggles with it as best as he can, and continues to work, as
best as and as much as he can over the years. He doesn‟t make much money
during those long and painful years, but he does have work from time to time,
and enjoys the participation in the work force and the dignity that comes with
being a contributing member of society. Another person might have given up
and claimed total and permanent disability at a much earlier stage. This sounds
romantic and idealized, but there are many such people who work long past the
time that others have given up and left the work force. Now, Granovsky reaches
the stage where he simply must give up — his pain and functional limitations
have progressed to the point where he simply cannot do it any more. He looks
at those who gave up earlier, and they enjoy a pension because of their
disability. He gets nothing. Why? Because he tried to work when he was
seriously disabled. It is hard for us to understand how the denial of a pension to
Granovsky under these circumstances would not engage his sense of self-worth
and human dignity.
The “human dignity” principle is, at least in this context, a rhetorical way of
saying that a complaint is not a serious or profound one. We doubt that the
“dispassionate” person in Granovsky‟s position would tell a personal tale of
indifference. His story would sound more like our rendition of Granovsky‟s
history than the Court‟s analysis of comparator groups and “drop-out” provisions.
As an aside, the “immutability” principle seems to have re-emerged in the
Court‟s section 15 analysis in this case: “Some of the grounds listed in s. 15 are
clearly immutable, such as ethnic origin. A disability may be, but is not
necessarily, immutable, in the sense of not being subject to change.”14 It had been
thought by many that immutability had been rejected as a characteristic of protected
grounds under section 15 in Egan,15 where the Court (unanimous on the point)
found that the protected grounds are inherent characteristics that cannot be changed
except at unacceptable personal cost.16 Immutability is a troubled concept and may
serve to confuse section 15 analysis if it is reintroduced. As Justice Binnie
acknowledged, disabilities may not be immutable, and often are not static.
________________________________________________________________
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14
15
16

Id., at 740.
Granovsky, supra, note 2, at 720.
Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
Id., at 528.
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Modern medicine is able to perform sex change operations, so even sex may be
considered mutable. Age is an ever-changing characteristic, but one over which
the individual can exercise no control. Political, philosophical and religious
beliefs are clearly subject to change, but not simply as a product of will. Sexual
orientation is a manifestation of desire, often coupled with chosen behaviour.
One‟s innermost sexual desires are not matters of choice, but inevitably,
decisions to have sex are so. The “immutability” concept could serve to cloud
the application of the law to protected groups and, in our view, should not reenter Canadian equality rights discourse.

III. QUEBEC (COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DES
DROITS DE LA JEUNESSE) V. MONTRÉAL (CITY)17
The unanimous decision of the Court was written by Madam Justice
L‟Heureux-Dubé, and concerns three cases of persons who were rejected for
employment or dismissed based on “physical anomalies” that do not result in
functional limitations for the purposes of the employment for which they had
applied or were engaged in prior to dismissal. The prospective employers took
the position that the anomalies in question were not “handicaps,” and therefore
were not protected under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.18
The prospective employees were as follows:
(1) Mercier was trained for and applied for a job as a gardener-horticulturalist
with the City of Montreal. In a pre-employment medical examination, she
was found to have a “minor thoracolumbar scoliosis.” The medical
experts determined that Mercier was not at greater risk for lower back
pain in the short, medium and long term.
(2) Troloi was hired as a probationary employee for 12 months by the
Boisbriand police force. He performed his duties admirably until he
suffered an acute attack of ileitis. He was subsequently diagnosed with
“Crohn‟s disease,” a chronic disease of the digestive tract that may
remain benign, or may require several operations for treatment. Although
Troloi enjoyed a complete recovery and was fully able to perform his
duties as a police officer, Boisbriand dismissed him anyway, saying that it
preferred to fill its complement with officers “who present the lowest risk
of absenteeism.”
________________________________________________________________
17
18

Boisbriand, supra, note 4.
R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12.
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(3) Hamon was refused employment with the Montreal police on the basis of
anomalies in his spinal column that are asymptomatic and do not result in
any discomfort, disability or limitation. The police department took the
position that persons such as Hamon can be excluded because there is a risk
that they will develop incapacitating and recurring lower back pain.
The Court found that “handicap” is not restricted to handicaps that cause
functional limitations, but includes ailments that do not give rise to any
limitation or functional disability. 19 As a result, all three of the prospective
employees had been discriminated against on the basis of handicap since they all
had ailments that did not create functional limitations on their abilities to work,
but nonetheless were perceived as being obstacles to their employment.
Although the decision runs for 87 paragraphs, it is straightforward. The
proscription against discrimination on the basis of handicap in the context of
employment, as set out in the Quebec Charter, is similar to human rights
legislation found in other Canadian jurisdictions, and has at its core the goal of
assisting handicapped persons “to take part in the life of the community on an
equal level with others.”20
It would be strange indeed if the legislature had intended to enable persons with
handicaps that result in functional limitations to integrate into the job market, while
excluding persons whose handicaps do not lead to functional limitations.21

Indeed, “subjective and erroneous perceptions regarding the existence of such
limitations” is the very essence of discrimination on the basis of handicap. It is the
perception that an individual cannot perform work ably that is at the core of what is
legally protected, and permitting even more arbitrary discrimination where there is
no physical basis for the conclusion at all would be perverse.
There is a second and complementary rationale for the decision. A
“handicap” may not result in functional limitations today, but may do so
tomorrow. Indeed, that fear lay at the heart of the decisions by the prospective
employers to refuse to employ the complainants. “[T]he Charter also prohibits
discrimination based on the actual or perceived possibility that an individual
may develop a handicap in the future.” 22
This reasoning is consistent with the jurisprudence concerning the nature of
discrimination on the basis of handicap/disability. It may also foreshadow future
________________________________________________________________
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Boisbriand, supra, note 4, at 697.
Id., at 700, citing McKenna, “Legal Rights For Persons With Disabilities in Canada:
Can the Impasse Be Resolved?” (1997-98), 29 Ottawa L. Rev. 153, at 163-64.
21
Boisbriand, supra, note 4, at 688.
22
Id., at 700.
20
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reasoning concerning the use of predictive tools to identify persons at higher risk
for future medical problems, and then using that identification as a basis for
imposing disadvantages on them (such as refusing them employment).
From a business perspective, it makes sense that an employer would wish to
hire employees that it hopes will have low rates of absenteeism and little risk of
paid leave by reason of disability. Strict application of this business logic could
potentially lead to the use of DNA testing of potential employees to obtain
long-term predictions about their health history in order to predict the long-term
risks that they will cause the employer in terms of greater expense by reason of
ailment over the course of their working life.
On the other hand, as is recognized in the Quebec Charter and similar
legislation in other jurisdictions, an employer is entitled to satisfy itself that
prospective employees are able to function in their jobs (i.e., to be satisfied that
any functional limitations are not inconsistent with their ability to do their
work). For example, an airline might fairly preclude persons with insufficient
visual acuity from flying airplanes. This policy would not extend to an airline
excluding a person with some abnormality of the eye that does not affect her
ability to see at an acceptable level. The grey area arises where the prospective
employee can see well enough now, but has a predisposition to premature loss
of visual acuity that poses a greater than average risk of expense to the
employer at a later stage. That question, however, is left to be determined
within the second part of the human rights analysis: once there is a finding of
discrimination based on handicap, the prospective employer may seek to justify
that discrimination. That issue was not before the Court in these cases.
Of note for future cases is the Court‟s reliance on section 15 of the Charter in
reaching a conclusion that tends to harmonize human rights concepts among
Canadian jurisdictions. It seems clear that nothing will turn on the use of
differential terms such as “handicap” and “disability” in different human rights
legislation and in the Charter. Although the Court has not stated that human
rights legislation must “mirror” the protection afforded by section 15 of the
Charter, when Boisbriand and Vriend23 are read together, it does seem that the
Court is finding a nucleus of human rights protection that is national in scope.
These decisions do not go so far as mandating such a national structure of human
rights protection, but the discussion concerning remedy in Vriend suggests that
the Court is inferring a common will across the country to develop and maintain
consistent human rights standards.24 Although these standards may not be
________________________________________________________________
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Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
In Vriend, eight of the justices found that it was appropriate to “read in” sexual
orientation to Alberta‟s human rights legislation, on the basis that such a remedy was really less
intrusive than striking down the impugned portions of the law. This conclusion is only warranted
where it is presumed that the defect is minor relative to the entire legislation. The majority
24
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required by section 15 of the Charter, consistent reinforcing of these standards by
the courts does contribute to a national rights culture that is bound to influence
the political climate in which rights legislation is devised.
Boisbriand is not as controversial as Vriend because the subject matter is less
charged with religious and moral overtones. Within Quebec there may be
resistance to what we see as a policy by the Court to find national standards —
the national nature of which may be offensive to Quebec nationalists, who wish
to promulgate their own made-in-Quebec standards. Seen in this light, we view
Boisbriand as significant, more for what it says about the Court‟s role as a
national institution than for the development of equality rights jurisprudence.

IV. LOVELACE V. ONTARIO25
1. Summary of the Decision
Ontario established a program for the distribution of proceeds from a new
casino to Ontario First Nations communities registered under the Indian Act
(Canada).26 Various aboriginal communities not registered as bands under the
Act sought to be included in the program. Ontario refused to include them, and,
consequently, the appellants brought these proceedings. The Court held that
Ontario‟s exclusion of non-registered communities did not constitute
discrimination within the meaning of section 15(1). This finding did not
necessitate a determination of whether the program was an “affirmative action
program” protected under section 15(2). However, the court inclined to the
view that section 15(2) is “confirmatory and supplementary to” section 15(1),
rather than an exception to section 15(1).27 Since the program was found not to
infringe section 15, there was no need to consider section 1 of the Charter.
The Court also found that the program was intra vires Ontario: section
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 186728 does not preclude provincial programs
aimed at aboriginal peoples or communities. Ontario did not define which
groups of aboriginal peoples are “First Nations” for the purposes of the casino
project. Rather, Ontario used the definition of “band” found in the Indian Act,

concluded that Alberta would prefer to have human rights legislation. Justice Major, writing for
himself, would not have read the protection into the Act, and instead would have left it to the
legislature to respond. Neither approach precluded a broad range of responses from the legislature
(including re-enacting the discriminatory legislation by use of the override provision).
25
Supra, note 5.
26
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
27
Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at 1009.
28
(U.K.), 30-31 Vict., c. 3.
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and in so doing “has done nothing to impair the status or capacity of the
appellants as aboriginal peoples.”29
The heart of the appellants‟ argument was the plight of non-registered
aboriginal communities. A compelling argument can be made that the
classification systems promulgated by the Indian Act are discriminatory, but
that argument was not before the court, and the Court declined to deal with a
collateral attack on the federal law: “these important collateral issues are not
properly raised in this appeal and, therefore, cannot be decided herein.” 30
The program, by directing substantial sums to bands registered under the
Indian Act, has the effect of supporting and strengthening the institutions that
arise as a consequence of federal policy. This institutional structure has, itself,
led to distinctions between band communities and non-band communities in
respect to land, government and gaming/casino issues. Although the categories of
registered bands and non-registered communities are not hermetically distinct
(each community having a distinctive history and situation), as a rule, registered
bands are reserve-based, have a political infrastructure regulated by the Indian
Act and have a history of government-to-government relations with the provinces
and Canada. Ontario‟s program is designed to address the needs of registered
bands, particularly in respect to the issues of land, self-government and
ameliorating impoverished conditions through the distribution of resources to
the bands.31
The program, therefore, is said to be tailored to the circumstances of band
communities, and those circumstances are, at least in part, a by-product of
federal law and policy, which was not in issue in the case.
The Court‟s reasoning is tautological once consideration of the
discriminatory impact of federal law and policy is eliminated from the analysis.
Canada has established institutional structures under the Indian Act which have
influenced the structure of First Nations governance. Those communities
included under the Indian Act have received certain benefits as a result of their
inclusion, and have unique status under Canadian law. So-called “non-status”
First Nations individuals and communities can argue (as they did in Lovelace)
that they are the most disadvantaged of the disadvantaged, and that they suffer
because of their wrongful exclusion of benefits under an unfair legal regime. It is
a compelling argument, and for the sake of this comment, we presume it to be
true.
Ontario did not create the distinctions between First Nations persons and
communities under the Indian Act. First Nations communities tend to be
________________________________________________________________
29
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Lovelace, supra, note 27, at 1013.
Id., at 960.
Id., at 996.
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centred on identifiable reserve lands that have both political and proprietary
significance. Self-governance is based, at least in part, on land and race, just as
national and provincial claims to jurisdiction are based on territorial autonomy
and definitions of the people who are included in or excluded from
membership. Those who are excluded face the double burdens of being affected
by the negative impacts of the institutional structures created by or supported
by the Indian Act while simultaneously being excluded from benefits conferred
by the Act on status bands and the members thereof.
Further, issues have arisen as to the rights of First Nations to pursue gaming
activities. Among other things, First Nations communities have taken the
position that provincial regulation of gaming activities within the province do
not apply to band reserves. If First Nations are permitted to conduct unlimited
and unregulated gaming operations on reserves, then the province could face
serious social problems extending far beyond the borders of the reserves.
On this basis, the Court finds that Ontario‟s program is tailored to respond to
the particular interests of bands under the Indian Act. Such discrimination as
there may be arises by operation of policy decisions made by Canada rather
than Ontario. For the purposes of Lovelace, the Indian Act is presumed to be
constitutional, but it is from the Indian Act that the real problems arise.
This decision may presage difficulties for equality rights litigation in the
future, given the many overlapping areas of jurisdiction between federal and
provincial levels of government. In Egan,32 the Court found that Canada could
not rely upon provincial legislation to cure discrimination in a federal law.
Now, in Lovelace, the Court has held that Ontario does not discriminate if it
bases its categories of exclusion and inclusion on federal legislation that may
itself be discriminatory. At first glance, this approach may be the most sensible
way in which to structure constitutional discourse in a federal state: any attack
on a law must be made directly, and not on a collateral basis. If the
discrimination arises by reason of the Indian Act, then that Act must be put in
issue, and Canada should be called upon to defend it. However, it is possible
that (hypothetically) there could be discrimination in the Indian Act that could
be saved under section 1, whereas the discriminatory impact of extending the
application of the Indian Act to a provincial program could not be so saved. In a
federal state, there must be some integration of legal concepts if policy and
programs are to be harmonized and work together. It seems, for the moment at
any rate, that where a section 15 challenge is made in an area of joint
jurisdiction and action, the wisest course to take would be to challenge the
legislative structure at both levels of government to avoid having a discriminatory
________________________________________________________________
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basis for one jurisdiction‟s laws used as a basis to justify another jurisdiction‟s
laws.

V. LITTLE SISTERS BOOK AND ART EMPORIUM V. CANADA
(MINISTER OF JUSTICE)33
1. Summary of the Decision
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium (“Little Sisters”) is a bookstore in
Vancouver catering to the lesbian and gay communities. It is not a “XXX
Bookstore” carrying predominately pornographic materials, but it does carry a
range of materials about sex and sexuality including erotica aimed at lesbians
and gay men. Little Sisters alleged that it had been discriminated against by
Canada Customs officials going back to 1984, by outright prohibitions on the
importation of legal materials and extensive delays and costs associated with
confiscations and reviews of legal materials that Little Sisters sought to import
for sale in its store.
The Customs Act and the schedules under the Customs Tariff legislation
authorize Customs officials to intercept materials imported into Canada, and to
reject their importation if those materials are found to be obscene within the
meaning of that term under section 163 of the Criminal Code.34 Little Sisters
claimed that this legislation contravened its rights to free speech, and
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. Little Sisters also claimed that
the conduct of Customs officials pursuant to the impugned legislation
contravened these same rights.
Little Sisters placed a rich factual record before the trial court, establishing
systematic differential treatment by Customs officials over a period of several
years. The evidence established that :
(1) materials imported by Little Sisters were detained for lengthy periods, and in
some cases ruled obscene by Customs officials when those same materials
were freely imported by “mainstream” bookstores, and in some cases were
available in local public libraries;
(2) Customs officials had little training and inadequate resources to make
determinations of “obscenity,” and frequently did so on the basis of
superficial reviews of the materials before them;
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(3) standards applied by Customs officials included a proscription against
depictions of anal intercourse despite court rulings and opinions from
the Department of Justice that depictions of anal intercourse are not
obscene in and of themselves;
(4) the administrative structure put in place for the exercise of Customs‟
jurisdiction to prevent importation of “obscene” materials was
cumbersome, slow, impenetrable, and involved a reverse onus clause
imposed on the importer once an initial determination of obscenity had
been made by Customs officials; and
(5) the treatment suffered by Little Sisters over the years was specifically
targeted against it, and there was no basis for this targeting other than an
apprehension by Customs officials that erotica aimed at lesbians and
gay men was more suspect than other forms of erotica. Little Sisters had
been subjected to more intense scrutiny than adult bookstores catering
to a heterosexual clientele.
The majority of the Court found that the impugned legislative scheme is a
prima facie violation of the right to free speech, and thus must be justified by
the state under section 1 of the Charter. The same justifications for laws
prohibiting obscenity, which were upheld in Butler,35 were available to justify
prohibitions on the importation of obscene materials into Canada. However, the
actions of Customs officials pursuant to the legislation were not justifiable: the
officials must apply the community standards harm test in accordance with
Butler to determine whether materials are obscene. On the facts of this case,
Customs officials had applied the standard erroneously, and in the process had
infringed Little Sisters‟ freedom of speech and right to be free from
discrimination. The impugned legislation did contain a reverse onus provision
that was constitutionally impermissible, but aside from that provision, the
legislation itself was found to be constitutional. The appropriate remedy in this
case must respond to the unconstitutional conduct by officials.
Given the time that had elapsed since the trial commenced, and the changes
Canada has made since that time in the way in which it administers the
legislation, it was not appropriate for the Court to do more than uphold the
declaration by the trial judge that rights and freedoms had been infringed in the
past. Any future problems in the application of the legislation as regards Little
Sisters could be the subject of further proceedings, based on the reasoning in the
decision.
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2. Comments
(a) Discriminatory Standards of Obscenity
There are serious problems with the Butler decision, and those problems
colour the decision in Little Sisters. Little Sisters argued that the principles in
Butler focus on community standards and harm done as a consequence of the
publication and consumption of certain kinds of graphic materials. The Court
was unwilling to entertain a collateral attack on the constitutionality of the
obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code: “No constitutional question was
stated regarding the validity or constitutional limits of s. 163 of the Criminal
Code. The absence of notice of such a constitutional question precludes the
wide-ranging reconsideration of Butler sought by the appellants and some of
the intervenors …”36 Thus, the decision in Little Sisters proceeds on the
presumption that Butler is good law. Within that framework, the appellants
asked the Court to find that there should be differential application of Butler to
gay and lesbian erotica.
Butler is premised on a “harms”-based analysis. The “harms” in question
conflate sex, violence and objectification of the body, usually to the detriment of
women.37 Assuming (without agreeing) that there is such harm in some
heterosexual pornography, the same cannot usually be said to hold true for samesex erotica, which does not reinforce delimited sexual stereotypes and power
imbalances. On a philosophical level, it could be argued that same-sex
pornography actually undermines typical gender stereotypes, rather than
reinforcing them. As a matter of common sense, depictions of sexual activity
between members of the same sex do not implicate power imbalances between
genders. That does not mean, however, that same-sex erotica/pornography is free
from power imbalances or degradation.
It is also arguable that pornography has an educative function in the lesbian
and gay communities in a way that heterosexual pornography does not. Popular
culture includes pervasive images of sexualized behaviour between
heterosexuals — from the clinical forms of sex education available in schools
to depictions of sex on television, in the movies and in literature. Until quite
recently, there have been few comparable sources of information for lesbians
and gay men about how to be sexual with each other, and pornography has
served the function of illustrating a range of same-sex sexual practices. It is at
least arguable, then, that pornography in the lesbian and gay communities is an
important source of information for lesbians and gay men. It may perform an
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even more important task by normalizing the conduct it depicts. Photographs
and videos are artefacts, and the fact that they exist and are permitted to exist
bestows upon them a legitimacy and reality that may normalize same-sex
sexuality itself, an important side effect for lesbians and gay men struggling
with the minority status of their sexual desires. However, the argument can be
turned on its head: the more significant the images, the greater the need to draw
some boundaries between acceptable depictions and those that promote
degradation. Put another way, if lesbians and gay men are learning how to be
sexual from pornography, it is perhaps all the more important that they are not
learning that degradation is part of healthy sexual conduct.
Theoretical discussions about sex and the body are interesting, and we agree
that there are important cultural differences between heterosexual and same-sex
sexual norms. However, of what practical use is the discussion for the Supreme
Court of Canada? The Court was asked to find that different standards should
apply to same-sex pornography. Justice Binnie held that taking this argument to
its logical conclusion “would mean that gay and lesbian publications would not
be subject to the ordinary border regime applicable to other forms of
expression.”38 In addition, these publications would not be subject to the same
criminal prohibitions found in the Criminal Code.
In essence, these arguments cannot form the basis for a section 15 claim
without addressing the general law of obscenity and the test in Butler. The test
applied under Butler is whether the depictions are “degrading or dehumanizing”
and fails the community standards tolerance of harm test.39 This is a minefield for
lesbian and gay erotica. As was argued to the Court by the appellants, the record
of the Customs officials is evidence, in and of itself, that principles of general
application as to what constitutes “degrading or dehumanizing” depictions, and
what the community perceives to be harmful to society, is ineluctably shaped by a
heterosexual view of the world. On no view of the test would consensual vaginal
intercourse between consenting partners, by itself, violate the Butler standard. On
the view of Customs personnel for over a decade, consensual anal intercourse
between consenting same-sex partners was obscene.
It is simply unacceptable, however, that a group of persons should be
exempted from the application of a provision of the Criminal Code. We say this
not as a statement of legal principle, but of political reality. The lesbian and gay
community cannot take itself out of the criminal laws of general application
simply on the basis that its communities are different, and that majoritarian
standards of sexual propriety are discriminatory. However, the majoritarian
standards of sexual propriety are inherently discriminatory: what a heterosexual
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man would find degrading, if done to him, may well be the height of desire for
a gay man. As has been stated repeatedly by the Supreme Court, 40 gay people
have suffered a long history of disadvantage. Although discrimination in the
law has been reduced by legislation and court decisions over the past two
decades, and the pace of that reduction has accelerated in recent years as a
consequence of authoritative decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada, it
would be naïve to suggest that social discrimination has been eliminated. It is
here that the community standards harms-based test becomes problematic, and
where Justice Binnie‟s reasons fail to address the underlying difficulties with
state supervision of lesbian and gay erotica under the rubric of Butler. The
problem is best captured in the following passage:
The test is therefore not only concerned with harm, but harm that rises to the level
of being incompatible with the proper functioning of Canadian society. The
Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) argues that “for gays and lesbians
erotica and other material with sexual content is not harmful and is in fact a key
element of the quest for self-fulfilment” (factum, at para. 14). So described, the
CCLA has defined the material safely outside the Butler paradigm. Butler placed
harmful expression — not sexual expression — at the margin of s. 2(b).41

It should be obvious why such a result is troubling for lesbians and gay men.
The general standard is a heterosexual one. It is by definition majoritarian.
Justice Binnie found that “gay and lesbian culture as such does not constitute
a general exemption from the Butler test.”42 Put another way, “the attempt to
carve out of Butler a special exception for gay and lesbian erotica should be
rejected.”43 How could the Court find otherwise? And yet, the Court‟s refusal to
carve out a special exception leaves unanswered the justified critique of the
Butler principles as they are applied to lesbian and gay erotica: how can
“community standards” for sexually explicit material be applied fairly to lesbian
and gay erotica when the standards are heterosexual and are applied by
heterosexuals? The answer is more rhetorical riposte than analytical conclusion.
If there is a variable standard to be applied, then whose standard is it to be?
[Little Sisters] operate[s] a bookstore in a very public place open to anyone who
happens by, including potentially outraged individuals of the local community who
might wish to have the bookstore closed down altogether. If “special standards” are
to apply, whose “special standard” is it to be? There is some safety in numbers, and
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a national constituency that is made up of many different minorities is a guarantee
of tolerance for minority expression.44

This argument provides cold comfort for those negatively affected by the
current obscenity standard, but it is an inevitable by-product of the reasoning in
Butler. If the test for harm is based on the community‟s sense of what is
harmful, and is not to collapse into hopelessly subjective considerations, then
there must be a fictional “national constituency” where the trier of fact looks to
find a measuring stick that is something other than the trier‟s own personal
sense of what is not to be tolerated. Justice Binnie reviewed the recent
applications of the Butler standard and concluded that “[w]e have no evidence
that the courts are not able to apply the Butler test, and the reported decisions
seem to confirm that the identification of harm is a well understood
requirement …”45
(b) Remedies
Little Sisters traced the violation of its rights to the impugned Customs
legislation. Justice Binnie found that one provision of the law is
unconstitutional: the reverse onus obligation on an importer to show that
materials are not obscene once the state has decided that they are. This finding
does not alter the general administrative structure of the applicable customs
law, which provides a general instruction to Customs officials to prohibit the
importation of materials that are “obscene” within the meaning of the Criminal
Code. It is left to the state to establish the means by which this general
requirement is to be carried out.
Little Sisters argued that “a regulatory structure that is open to the level of
maladministration described in the trial judgment is unconstitutionally
underprotective of [its] constitutional rights and should be struck down in its
entirety.”46 On this point, the majority and the dissent part company. Justice
Binnie found there is nothing wrong with the legislation itself, and that the fault
lies in its implementation by the servants of the Crown: “A failure at the
implementation level, which clearly existed here, can be addressed at the
implementation level.”47
… an importer‟s rights may be protected in fact by statute, regulation, ministerial
direction or even departmental practice. What is crucial, at the end of the day, is
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that Charter rights are in fact respected. The modalities for achieving that objective
will vary with the context. There is nothing unconstitutional about the option
selected by Parliament in this case.48

This analysis is persuasive: many protections afforded under the criminal law,
for example, are not spelled out in legislation, but instead are entrusted to law
enforcement agencies to enforce. Charter requirements should inform the exercise
of public power, whether that exercise derives directly from legislation itself, or
as a result of action taken pursuant to the law. These general propositions do not
seem controversial.
What is missing from the analysis, though, is a practical assessment of the
prospect of constitutional enforcement of obscenity laws by agents of Canada
Customs. It is possible, of course, for Canada Customs to expend the resources
necessary to train its personnel properly for the task, but it should be remembered
that the primary focus of the work of Customs is not to enforce the Criminal
Code. Customs is engaged in regulating trade across the border, levying and
collecting taxes associated with imports, and prohibiting the import of items that
are not permitted in the country. “Obscene” materials are only a small subset of
items that may be imported illegally.
The record was replete with references to the inadequacy of the job done by
Customs in respect to potentially “obscene” materials. Printed matter was not
read thoroughly, but rather was scanned to determine if various salacious
references were found with minimum frequency. Such a review could not
possibly provide a basis for assessing the artistic merit of the reviewed work.
Customs officials had minimal training. The task of reviewing materials for
obscenity is an unpopular one in the Customs bureau, and most staff members
do not stay in that position for very long.
The record did not disclose the proportion of reviewed materials that was
destined for retail sale. The argument concerning institutional competence may
well depend on such an analysis. If, as we suspect, the vast majority of
intercepted materials are destined for retail businesses where they are offered
for sale to the public, then it would seem to be folly to assign the task of review
to Customs, rather than to local police, who are charged with enforcing the very
same obscenity standards. If a retailer imports an obscene publication, it can be
charged when the material is offered for sale to the public.
Justice Binnie adverted to the question of institutional competence
throughout his reasons without putting that question squarely in issue: “The
problem here is not with the legislators but with the failure of those responsible
to exercise the powers that they possess, including, according to the trial judge,
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the failure of Customs to make available adequate resources to do the job
effectively.”49
Justice Iacobucci, writing in dissent, found that where legislation “lends itself
to the repeated violations of Charter rights, as does the legislative scheme here,
the legislation itself is partially responsible and must be remedied.”50 The proper
test is not whether the legislation is facially neutral and could be applied in a
constitutionally sound manner. “Instead, the crucial consideration is that the
legislation makes no reasonable effort to ensure that it will be applied
constitutionally to expressive materials. It lacks an adequate process to ensure
that s. 2(b) rights are fully considered and respected.”51
Justice Iacobucci‟s conclusion — as a matter of practical common sense —
simply must be correct: “The need for structural reform is reinforced by Customs‟
long history of excessive, inappropriate censorship. … These are not the kinds of
problems that can be solved by simply directing Customs to behave
themselves.”52 Justice Iacobucci provided detailed suggestions as to the sorts of
institutional reform that could lead to proper safeguards when reviewing imported
materials for obscenity. At the core of Justice Iacobucci‟s reasoning is the
underlying conclusion — driven by the factual record set out in the decision — that
Customs, as currently organized, simply lacks the institutional competence and will
to make determinations of obscenity in conformity with Charter guarantees.
Although the decision in the case will not require legislative action by Parliament,
Justice Iacobucci advocated that it do so nonetheless: “I hope that Parliament …
will address the problems identified in this appeal even without an order from this
Court.”53
To this extent, both Binnie and Iacobucci JJ. are correct. Justice Binnie
concluded that the law itself is facially neutral, and that Customs can enforce
the law in compliance with the Charter. Justice Iacobucci found that the record
and the evidence of institutional limitations are such that although it may be
possible for Customs to comply with the Charter, it is unrealistic to expect that
it will do so without firm and direct guidance from Parliament. Both being
correct, in our respectful view, Justice Iacobucci‟s approach is the more
pragmatic. It is to be hoped that Parliament heeds his call for reform, even
though it is not compelled to do so by order of the Court.
On the face of the decision, it seems odd that the Court chose to comment on
the practical application of Butler after already holding that it could not embark
upon a consideration of the constitutional status of that decision. However, the
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comment is a proper response to the concerns raised by Little Sisters: an
inappropriate application of Butler is a failure by Customs officials (as the
Court concludes). An inherently discriminatory test for obscenity, arising from
the logic and natural application of Butler, is a proper section 15 claim for
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Although the Court expressly
declined to deal with the challenge to Butler, it effectively did so and found that
Butler, properly interpreted and applied, would not lead to discriminatory
results. It may be that the Court will be prepared to reconsider these points in a
case where Butler is put squarely in issue, but the logic of the decision suggests
that the Court is not favourably disposed to such a challenge. In our view,
advocates for sexual minorities will have to return to the drawing board to
devise an analysis that protects minority tastes within the structure of Butler, at
least for the foreseeable future.

VI. CONCLUSION
While we do not find a unifying theme among these cases, the deference
shown legislatures in these cases does support the view that the Court has
moved away from the more “activist” days of the Dickson and even the Lamer
Courts. The application of Law in Granovsky seems to lead towards a rather
mechanical exercise in comparison that focuses more on the choices that the
state faces in drawing its lines than upon the effect of those choices on
disadvantaged persons. If Law continues to be applied in this fashion, we
expect that equality rights cases will prove increasingly more difficult to win.
Although the Court found for the claimants in Boisbriand, the question was one
of interpretation of legislation, rather than its constitutionality. Effectively, the
Court found that Quebec chose a standard consistent with the national standard.
In Lovelace, the Court upheld Ontario‟s program without placing emphasis on
the effect the program has upon the appellants. The federal legislation that
creates the distinctions relied upon by Ontario became part of the context of the
case, rather than an integral aspect of the constitutional challenge itself. Finally,
in Little Sisters, the Court showed great deference to Parliament in its choice of
remedy.
We are critical of the “human dignity” test in Law. We see it as rhetorical
rather than analytical, but we do agree that human dignity is the central interest
protected by equality rights. A true assessment of the impact of a law on human
dignity requires a close and careful consideration of the effect of the law on the
claimant. Effective equality rights protection requires that there be effective
remedies available once a violation of equality rights has been identified. One
would expect that an analysis of these aspects of an equality rights claim would
be at the forefront of any section 15 decision. We are uneasy that such was not
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the case in Lovelace and Little Sisters, and we believe that the focus in
Granovsky was misplaced. However, the Court has not rejected an effectsbased equality rights analysis, and it remains to be seen how that analysis will
be balanced against the need to accord the state sufficient latitude to develop
and implement social policy.

